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Abstract: 
 
Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2004a) report on an empirical study to elicit public preferences regarding 
the efficiency-equality trade-off in health, where the majority of respondents violated 
monotonicity. The procedure used has been subject to criticisms regarding potential biases in the 
results. The aim of this paper is to analyse whether violation of monotonicity remains when a 
revised questionnaire is used. We test: whether monotonicity is violated when we allow for 
inequality neutral preferences and also if we allow for preferences that would reject any option 
which gives no health gain to one group; whether those who violate monotonicity actually have 
non-monotonic or Rawlsian preferences; whether the titration sequence of the original 
questionnaire may have biased the results; whether monotonicity is violated when an alternative 
question is administered. Finally, we also test for symmetry of preferences. The results confirm the 
evidence of the previous study regarding violation of monotonicity. 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Health related social welfare functions; monotonicity; Rawlsian; equality-efficiency 
trade-off. 
 
 
JEL: D39; D63; I10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments: 
 We would like to thank Andy Dickerson, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Paul Dolan, Indranil Dutta, and 
Jenny Roberts for their input. Special thanks are due to Alan Williams. We are also thankful for 
comments to the participants of the workshop at University of Alicante, June 2005, the European 
Health Economics Conference (ECHE) at Rome, July 2008 and at the Sheffield Health Economics 
Decision Science seminar, July 2008. We are grateful to all the respondents who agreed to take 
part in the survey and also to the Spanish Instituto de Estudios Fiscales for financial support to 
undertake this research. The usual disclaimers apply. 
 1 
Is more health always better?  
Exploring public preferences that violate monotonicity  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The two main objectives of publicly funded health care are, subject to resource constraints, to 
maximise population health and to reduce inequality in health across groups within the population, 
which leads to an interesting question regarding the relationship between these two objectives: 
what is the relevant efficiency-equality trade-off in health policy decisions.  While there are 
several ways in which to address this issue, the approach we followed in Abásolo and Tsuchiya 
(2004a; A&T henceforth) was by exploring the trade-off supported by members of the public. This 
builds on Williams (1997), where the possibility of applying weights to health gains to different 
socio-economic groups to reflect the varying prospects of achieving a ‘fair innings’ is discussed. 
 
A health related social welfare function (HRSWF) is proposed as a way to represent explicitly the 
trade-off between the total level of health (concern for efficiency) and its distribution (concern for 
equality) (see Dolan, 1998). The HRSWF would be defined not over individual utility levels but 
over health of subpopulations (Wagstaff, 1994). The relevant subpopulations 1 and 2 are of equal 
size and homogeneous. Therefore, social welfare would depend on the health of both groups:  
 
                 W = W(H1, H2),      where H1, H2 > 0                                                                             [1] 
  
where W is the level of social welfare associated with the health distribution (H1, H2), and H1 and  
H2 represent the health of group 1 and 2 respectively.   
 
Within this framework, A&T proposed a HRSWF specification that fulfilled the main properties of 
conventional social welfare functions (i.e. individualism, comparability, cardinal measurability, 
additivity and monotonicity), but also allowed for non-monotonic preferences that might arise 
when health inequalities are regarded as being too large. This HRSWF specification was motivated 
by an empirical study that elicits social preferences regarding the efficiency-equality trade off in 
health, in a way that can be translated into the HRSWF space. This exercise was based on a 
interview questionnaire designed in a programme of research on this topic based at the 
Universities of York and Sheffield, UK  (Shaw et al, 2001; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2005; 2009; 
forthcoming). 
 
The basic idea can be described as follows. In the questions, health is measured in terms of life 
expectancy at birth. Given the health of two socioeconomic groups, high class (H1) and low class 
(H2), the question presented to respondents showed a 5-year difference in life expectancy between 
higher and lower socio-economic groups  (75 and 70 years, respectively): viz. point   I(75,70) in 
Figure 1. In the first question, the respondent was asked to choose between two health 
programmes which had exactly the same cost. Health programme A increased the life expectancy 
of both socio-economic groups by 2 years each (point a); and health programme B increased the 
life expectancy of the worse-off group by 4 years (point b). Let us denote the choice between these 
two programmes as “(+2,+2) versus (+0,+4)”, indicating health gains for higher and lower 
socioeconomic groups, respectively. If the respondent chose programme A, then no further 
questions were asked.      
 
Those respondents who answered B to the above were referred to a follow-up set of questions in 
which they were asked to choose between programme A and a modified programme B which gave 
smaller and smaller life expectancy gains to the lower class, in 6-month decrements. In other 
words, programme A was always a (+2,+2), while programme B changed from c (+0,+3.5), to d 2 
(+0,+3), to e (+0,+2.5) and to f (+0,+2.0). The expectation is that the respondent would “switch” to 
programme A at some point. These choices represented different degrees of the equality-efficiency 
trade-off. The larger the sacrifice in terms of efficiency that one is ready to make, in order to 
reduce inequalities, the later would be one’s switching point. Once the individual has switched, an 
indifference point can be worked out along the horizontal line I-II. If, for instance, a respondent 
chose programme B when the choice (+2,+2) versus (+0,+3.5) was offered, but switched to 
programme A for the choice (+2,+2) versus (+0,+3), then it was assumed that the respondent was 
indifferent between (+2,+2) and (+0,+3.25) the mid-point between c and d. The interpretation is 
that we have identified two points lying on the same social welfare contour which in this case 
corresponds to the monotonic indifference curve drawn in Figure 1. Given [2] below the relevant 
values of the parameters can be worked out.   
 
 
Figure 1: Types of indifference curves around a 
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To not switch at the very last question and to prefer a variant of programme B (+0, +2) over 
programme A (+2, +2) implies a violation of the  strong monotonicity principle.  Strong 
monotonicity requires that if the health of one group (i = 1, 2) of individuals increases, ceteris 
paribus, the level of social welfare also increases, i.e.:  
 
                                                          ∂W/∂Hi > 0 for all i                                                 [2]         
 
However, it should be noted that there could be two types of respondents within this group.  The 
first type consists of those who have a non-monotonic preference and, thus, in terms of the 
HRSWF in Figure 1, support a social welfare contour with a positive slope at point a.  In their 
view, increasing the health of the better off group at this point will decrease social welfare (and 
thus their preferences violate [2]).  The second type consist of those who are Rawlsians, and are 
actually indifferent between the two programmes, but since there was no indifference option given 
in the questionnaire, they chose programme B over A (and there may have been other Rawlisans 
who chose A over B at the same junction).  In terms of Figure 1, in their view, the social welfare 3 
contour at point a has a vertical slope, and increasing the health of the better off group at this point 
will neither increase or decrease social welfare (and thus their preferences violate [2]). 
 
As reported in A&T, a representative sample of the Spanish population (N=973 valid responses) 
was interviewed on a face-to-face basis in 1999 and the results showed the notable outcome that 
the majority (57%) of those with valid responses still preferred programme B when the choice 
(+2,+2) versus (+0,+2) was offered, i.e. they had preferences that violated the strong monotonicity 
principle. 
 
The questionnaire design used in the original Spanish survey in 1999 had several drawbacks that 
cast some doubts on the results regarding violation of monotonicity (eg. Olsen 2004, Dutta 2006a, 
2006b). Firstly, regarding the design of the first question, the respondent was forced to choose 
between programmes A and B, therefore, not allowing for inequality neutral preferences; insofar 
as these individuals had chosen programme B, the proportion of those who violate monotonicity 
may have been overestimated. In addition, programme B gave no health gain to the better off and 
if this was a reason to choose programme A over B, results would also be biased for this reason, in 
this case underestimating the proportion of individuals violating monotonicity. Secondly, 
regarding the follow-up set of questions, the last question offered to the respondents consisted of 
choosing between (+2,+2) and (+0,+2). Although the majority of respondents violated strong 
monotonicity by choosing (+0,+2) over (+2, +2), as is noted above, this last question was not 
sufficient to rule out Rawlsian preferences, as an indifference option was not given in the follow 
up page. Thirdly, the titration sequence in which the follow-up questions were presented, could 
have ‘invited’ respondents to delay switching to programme A beyond the point at which they are 
indifferent between the two programmes, resulting in more respondents appearing as if they 
violate the monotonicity principle. On the other hand, there may be a tendency for survey 
respondents to favour the first (or the left hand side) option over alternatives that they see 
subsequently, in what has been called a “response order effect” (eg. Krosnik 1999).  Therefore, 
fourthly, there is the possibility that there was a bias towards (+2, +2), which always appeared on 
the left hand side, thus possibly leading to an underreporting of the extent of the violation of 
monotonicity.  Finally, the questionnaire did not undertake any question to check whether 
preferences are symmetric. 
 
In this paper, a new questionnaire is designed to address these issues of which the details are given 
in section 2 (methods). Section 3 reports the results of the new survey. Section 4 presents a general 
discussion of the results and the main conclusions are summarised in section 5.  
 
 
2. Methods and data 
 
Methods 
 
The revised questionnaire has been specifically designed to analyse the procedure by which public 
preferences were elicited. Figure 2 illustrates how the main questions of the new questionnaire 
work in the HRSWF framework (the actual diagrams accompanying the questions are reproduced 
in the appendices). Imagine there are two population groups (low socioeconomic class and high 
socioeconomic class), and their respective life expectancy at birth is represented as H1 and H2 
along the vertical and horizontal axes respectively. Point I (78,73) represents the current situation, 
with a five year inequality in health across the two groups. As before, the question on the first page 
(see A.1.1 in the appendix) corresponds to a choice between a move from point I to point a 
“programme A” (+2,+2) and a move from point I to point b “programme B” (+0,+4).  If the 
respondents prefer the latter, then they are directed to a follow-up page (see Q.4.1 in the 
Appendix), where in effect programme A remains constant (move from I to a) but programme B 4 
becomes less attractive (move from I to points to the left of b on the horizontal line). The point at 
which the respondent “switches” from programme B to programme A will indicate where the 
indifference curve through point a (+2,+2) intersects the horizontal line I-b.  As mentioned above, 
if the respondent prefers e (+0,+2) to a (+2,+2) then this would violate the strong monotonicity 
principle.  
 
 
Figure 2: Ordering health distributions into HRSWF framework with the new questionnaire 
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Now, several changes have been introduced in the questionnaire to further explore the violation of 
strong monotonicity:  
 
1. Testing if inequality neutral preferences affects the proportion who violate strong monotonicity. 
 
One of the concerns regarding the design of the first question in the original questionnaire is that 
since it did not allow for ties between the two programmes, there was no clear way of identifying 
those who are neutral to the distribution of health across the two population groups (i.e. simple 
health maximisers), who would have been forced to choose between programmes A and B. In 
order to address this issue, the questionnaire was amended to include an indifference option on the 
first page “A and B are equally good” (see Q.1.1). And in line with the follow-up page for those 
who select programme B, another follow-up page was designed for those who revealed themselves 
to be indifferent between programmes A and B in the first question (see Q.2.1). As with the 
original follow-up page, programme A continued to represent the move from I to a (+2,+2) and 
programme B represented the move from I to three points c' (+1,+3), m (+3,+1) and n (+4,+0) 
along the straight line ∆H1 + ∆H2 = C (see Figure 2). We refer to this question as inequality 
neutral.  Respondents can switch from programme A to B, or from programme B to A, but once 
switched, if they switched back, they were regarded as ‘invalid’ responses and excluded from all 
analyses.   
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2. Testing if “nobody should get nothing” is a strong concern that might affect the proportion of 
those violating strong monotonicity. 
 
Another thing to note about the first question is that whereas under programme A both population 
groups receive something, under programme B the better-off will receive no health benefit, and 
there may be those who find it unacceptable that a public policy programme should exclude a 
whole population subgroup from benefiting. If so, this might be an invitation for some to choose 
programme A, therefore underestimating preferences that violate strong monotonicity. In order to 
explore this possibility, a follow-up page for those who choose programme A on the first page was 
designed (see Q.3.1). On this page, programme A represented the move from point i to a (+2,+2) 
as before, but programme B now represented moves from I to a series of points on the horizontal 
line along point c' (+1,+3) to f' (+1,+1.5) of Figure 2, so that the better-off will receive a small 
health benefit, and a trade-off exercise similar to the original follow-up page could be carried out 
(aimed just at those who are concerned with “everybody getting something”). In the follow-up 
page respondents can switch from B to A; if they switched back (from A to B), they were regarded 
as ‘invalid’ responses and excluded from all analyses. We refer to this question as everybody gets 
something. 
 
3. Testing for the type of preferences of those who violate strong monotonicity: Rawlsian or non-
monotonic preferences?  
 
The last choice included in the follow-up of those who chose programme B in the main question of 
A&T was the one between a (+2,+2) and e (+0,+2). The majority chose (+0,+2) thus violating 
strong monotonicity. A&T interpreted this to indicate that all respondents with such preferences 
had non-monotonic preferences. However, given that the indifference option was not given, 
Rawlsian preferences could not be ruled out.  In this new questionnaire, an additional choice 
between the options a (+2,+2) and f (+0,+1.5) has been included (see Q.4.1), so that it can be 
empirically tested, and not just inferred, whether non-monotonic preferences actually exist. We 
will refer to this question as the main titration question. In this follow up page, respondents can 
switch from programme B to A; if they switched back (from A to B), they were regarded as 
‘invalid’ responses and excluded from all analyses. If the majority of individuals still preferred 
option f to option a in the last question, that would indicate that the median Spaniard has non-
monotonic, rather than Rawlsian preferences. 
 
4. Testing for bias due to the titration sequence of the questionnaire. 
 
Given the way the follow-up page of the questionnaire is designed based on titration, there is the 
possibility that respondents may have been affected by a “boiling frog”
 1 bias. This means that they 
would delay switching to programme A beyond the point at which they are indifferent between the 
two programmes, resulting in more respondents appearing as if they violate the strong 
monotonicity principle, but this would be an artefact of the questionnaire design, not their genuine 
preferences. In order to explore this possibility, in addition to the titration version of the follow-up 
page, an alternative variant was designed (main random), where the order of the programme pairs 
in the follow-up page appear randomly (see Q.1.2), in such a way that now the respondent faces a 
bigger gap between the successive programme B options (eg. from +0,+3 to +0,+1.5). The aim is 
to compare the proportion of individuals that choose programme B at corresponding stages of the 
                                                
1  The story of the boiling frog states that a frog can be boiled alive if the water is heated slowly enough — it is said 
that if a frog is placed in boiling water, it will jump out, but if it is placed in cold water that is slowly heated, it will 
never jump out (see for example, Scripture, 1897).  
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two variants and see if there are differences. Once the data are put in the titration ordering, the 
responses can switch from programme B to A as in the main titration variant; again, if they 
switched back (from A to B), they were regarded as ‘invalid’ responses and excluded from all 
analyses.  
 
5. Testing for the effect of programme (+2, +2) always appearing on the left hand side. 
 
In order to test the extent to which the results are affected by the location of the two programmes 
on the page, the first page with programme A (+2,+2) on the left hand side and programme B 
(+0,+4) on the right hand side (original alignment) was reproduced with (+2, +2) on the right hand 
side and labelled programme B, and (+0, +4) on the left hand side and labelled programme A 
(flipped alignment; see Q.5.1).  Again, the indifference option was given.  There was no follow up 
page under this format. We will refer to this question as the left-right effect.  
 
6. An alternative question to test for violation of strong monotonicity.  
 
An additional question was introduced in order to further explore whether or not the results of the 
A&T survey were robust regarding violation of strong monotonicity. Unlike the original question 
where the aim was to find people’s attitudes when health gains to the worse-off are lower and 
lower keeping constant the health of the better-off, in this new question we aimed to find people’s 
attitudes when health gains to the better-off are made larger and larger, while keeping the health of 
the worse-off constant (see Q.1.3). Respondents were asked in effect to compare on Figure 2 a 
move from I to a modified programme B which is located at points between g (+2.5,+2) and l  
(+4.5,+2), with reference to a fixed programme A at point  a (+2,+2). This means that on the first 
page, where there is an indifferent option, we have a direct test of Rawlsian preferences.  
Furthermore, on the follow-up page, programme B becomes increasingly more attractive relative 
to the fixed reference programme A in terms of efficiency but increasingly less attractive in terms 
of equality. Respondents can switch from programme A to B, or from programme B to A, but once 
switched, if they switched back, they were regarded as ‘invalid’ responses and excluded from all 
analyses.  This question is referred to as the alternative monotonicity. Monotonicity requires that 
points between g and k are more attractive than a regardless of its increased inequality.  
 
7. Testing for symmetry of preferences  
 
An interesting question that arises at this point is whether or not the HRSWF is symmetric.  The 
better-off in terms of health are also better-off in terms of economic status, so if respondents 
thought this was a relevant consideration, then they may well have an asymmetric HRSWF for use 
in the determination of public health care resource allocation. In other words public preferences 
maybe not only non-monotonic, but also asymmetric. In order to test for symmetry of preferences, 
a new question was designed (see Q.2.3), which refers to two small subgroups of 100 individuals 
selected from two population groups (the rich and the poor), and these two groups have the same 
life expectancy at birth (i.e. 75 years).  Small subgroups, as opposed to whole social class groups 
were chosen, since while it is unrealistic to assume that the outcomes involved in this question can 
apply to whole social class groups, it is quite realistic to select 100 individuals from each group, 
who have the health features described here.  Now, in Figure 2, the initial point is I’ on the 45 
degree ray and any increments are related to this new I’ point.  In effect, the questions asked 
respondents to firstly compare a move from point I’ to point x (+1,+1) with a move from I’ to y 
(+2,+0) and secondly compare the move from I’ to x (+1,+1) with a move from I’ to z (+0,+2).  
We refer to this question as symmetry. If symmetry around point I’ holds, then those who prefer x 
(+1,+1) to y (+2,+0) will prefer x (+1,+1) to z (+0,+2); and those who prefer y (+2,+0) to x (+1,+1) 
will prefer z (+0,+2) to x (+1,+1); in addition, symmetry requires that those who are indifferent in 7 
one question should also be indifferent in the other question. Note that satisfying one of these is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for an individual to support a symmetric HRSWF. 
 
Data 
 
A total of 1211 individuals over 18 years old were sampled randomly across Spain, and 
interviewed in their homes in December 2004, out of which 83.6% provided complete data 
(N=1013). This sample was representative of the Spanish general population in terms of age and 
sex; in general, 48% of the individuals were male, with average age of 45.15 (SD 18.10); and 52% 
female, with average age of 46.45 (SD 18.04). The overall questionnaire consisted of three 
different variants which were allocated to respondents randomly (N1=327, N2=345, N3=341; see 
Table 1a). The first variant had the main question with the indifference option and the three 
follow-up pages: one to test inequality neutral preferences (inequality neutral), another to test 
whether everybody should get some health benefit (everybody gets something), another to test for 
non-monotonicity of preferences (main titration) and another one to test whether the results are 
affected by the location of the programmes in the first page (left-right effect). The second variant 
started with the alternative monotonicity question (alternative monotonicity) and then moved on to 
the symmetry question (symmetry). The third variant had the first page of the main question, 
followed by the random version of the main question (main random) followed by questions not 
addressed in this paper.   
 
Table 1b presents the breakdown of excluded respondents by question. It can be seen that the 
percentage of invalid and missing cases varies across questions. The proportion of excluded cases 
goes from the 4.2% of the first page main question to the 38.5% of the inequality neutral follow-
up. Regarding the reason of exclusion, for Q.3.1 the percentage of invalid cases is relatively high 
(20.9%) showing that a higher proportion of respondents have difficulties to understand the 
everybody gets something follow-up. Something similar happens with the percentage of missing 
cases in the inequality neutral follow-up: the proportion of missing cases is 28.5%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a. Sample sizes and questionnaires  
 
  VARIANT 1  VARIANT 2  VARIANT 3 
QUESTION 1 
FIRST PAGE MAIN QUESTION 
(Q.1.1) 
MAIN RANDOM 
(Q.1.2) 
ALTERNATIVE 
MONOTONICITY 
(Q.1.3) 
QUESTION 2 
Follow-up INEQUALITY NEUTRAL 
(Q.2.1)    SYMMETRY (Q.2.3) 
QUESTION 3 
Follow-up EVERYBODY GETS STH 
(Q.3.1)     
QUESTION 4 
Follow-up MAIN TITRATION 
(Q.4.1)     
QUESTION 5  LEFT-RIGHT EFFECT (Q.5.1)     
TOTAL N = 1211  N1 = 407  N2 = 395  N3 =  409 
EXCLUDED (*)  80 (19.7%)  50 (12.7%)  68 (16.6%) 
VALID N = 1013  N1 = 327  N2= 345  N3 = 341 
(*) Respondents were excluded if they had invalid responses to at least one question, or had missing values (i.e. did 
not respond to at least one question). 
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Table  1b. Break down of excluded respondents by question 
 
VARIANT 1 (N=407)  INVALID (%)  MISSINGS (%) TOTAL N 
FIRST PAGE MAIN QUESTION (Q.1.1)  ----  17 (4.2)  407 
      Follow-up INEQUALITY NEUTRAL (Q.2.1)  4 (10.3%)  11 (28.2)  39 
      Follow-up EVERYBODY GETS SOMETHING 
(Q.3.1)  14 (20.9)  7 (10.4)  67 
      Follow-up MAIN TITRATION (Q.4.1)  13 (4.6)  8 (2.8)  283 
LEFT-RIGHT QUESTION (Q.5.1)  ----  21 (5.2)  407 
TOTAL  31 (7.6)  49 (12.0) *  407 
         
VARIANT 2 (N= 395)  INVALID  MISSINGS  TOTAL N 
MAIN RANDOM QUESTION (Q.1.2)  20 (5.1)  30 (7.6)  395 
         
VARIANT 3 (N= 409)  INVALID  MISSINGS  TOTAL N 
ALTERNATIVE MONOTONICITY QUESTION (Q.1.3)  27 (6.6)  35 (8.6)  409 
SYMMETRY QUESTION (Q.2.3)  ----  25 (6.1)  409 
TOTAL  27 (6.6)  41 (10.0) *  409 
 (*) The totals are lower than the actual sum of the column where some respondents have been missing in more than 
one question. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
1. Inequality neutrality  
 
Table 2 shows that only 6.7% of those who were given the first variant were indifferent between 
programmes A and B on the first page. The Table is made up of two parts.  The top part relates to 
the 327 respondents that answered this question.  On the first page of the questionnaire, where the 
relevant question was between points a versus b in Figure 2, with Programme A (78+2, 73+2) and 
Programme B (78+0, 73+4), 44 chose A, 261 chose B, and 22 were indifferent.  The bottom part 
of the Table relates to the 22 respondents who were indifferent between the two Programmes on 
the first page.  Each row presents the distribution of respondents when different combinations of 
Programmes A and B were presented.  So, the potential presence of health maximisers does not 
rule out violation of strong monotonicity of the majority. In addition, in the follow-up, the 
proportion of those who prefer programme B is much larger when it is represented by point c' 
compared to points that are further way from the 45 degree line (m and n in Figure 2) suggesting 
that distribution neutrality may only be relevant when the programme does not increase the current 
inequality in health.   
 
Table 2: Support of inequality neutral preferences and follow up (*)
 
 
Respondents answering the first variant (N=327) 
  Progrm A  Progrm B  Chose A  Chose B  Indifferent 
a vs b  78+2, 73+2 78+0, 73+4  44(13.5)  261 (79.8)  22 (6.7) 
Those respondents who chose indifferent on the first page (N=22) 
  Progrm A  Progrm B  Chose A  Chose B 
a vs c'  78+2, 73+2 78+1, 73+3  10 (45.5)  12 (54.5) 
a vs m  78+2, 73+2 78+3, 73+1  18 (81.8)  4 (18.2) 
a vs n  78+2, 73+2 78+4, 73+0 
 
20 (90.9)  2 (9.1) 
   (*) percentages sum to 100% along each row  9 
 
 
2. Everybody should get something 
 
The questionnaire accommodated those who are willing to target the worse-off but are also 
reluctant to give nothing to one party. Here, 13.5% of respondents preferred a over b of Figure 2 
and go on to the corresponding follow-up page that explores this question. Of these, a majority 
remains preferring programme A (see Table 3). The result is that, therefore, rearranging the 
benefits so that no group gets no health gain is not enough to invite these respondents to target the 
worse-off.  
 
Table 3: Testing if the absence of health benefits in programme B bias results (*) 
 
Respondents answering the first variant (N=327) 
  Progrm A  Progrm B  Chose A  Chose B  Indiff. 
a vs b  78+2, 73+2  78+0, 73+4  44(13.5)  261 (79.8)  22 (6.7) 
Those respondents who chose Progrm A on the first page (N=44) 
  Progrm A  Progrm B  Chose A  Chose B 
a vs c'  78+2, 73+2  78+1, 73+3  29 (65.9)  15 (34.1) 
a vs d'  78+2, 73+2  78+1, 73+2.5  34 (77.3)  10 (22.7) 
a vs e'  78+2, 73+2  78+1, 73+2  35 (79.5)  9 (20.5) 
a vs f'  78+2, 73+2  78+1, 73+1.5  37 (84.1)   7 (15.9) 
 
       (*) percentages sum to 100% along each row  
 
 
3. Rawlsian or non-monotonic 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the main question which aims to test whether those who violate strong 
monotonicity have Rawlsian or non-monotonic preferences.  
 
Table 4: Results of the main question (titration version). Testing for non-monotonicity 
 
Number of respondents answering the first variant (N=327) 
  Progrm A  Progrm B  Chose A  Chose B  Indiff. 
a vs b  78+2, 73+2  78+0, 73+4  44(13.5)  261 (79.8)  22 (6.7) 
Those respondents who chose Progrm B on the first page (N=261) 
  Progrm A  Progrm B  Chose A  Chose B 
a vs c  78+2, 73+2  78+0, 73+3  56 (18.4)  249 (81.6) 
a vs d  78+2, 73+2  78+0, 73+2.5  72 (23.6)  233 (76.4) 
a vs e  78+2, 73+2  78+0, 73+2  105 (34.4) 200 (65.6) 
a vs f  78+2, 73+2  78+0, 73+1.5 
 
140 (45.9) 165 (54.1) 
 
 Notes:  percentages sum to 100% along each row  
 
On the first page, 79.8% of respondents choose b (+0,+4) over a (+2,+2), whilst only 13.5% 
choose programme A. Looking at the 261 respondents who chose Programme B on the first page, 
as programme B becomes less efficient, more and more individuals shift to programme A showing 
a trade-off pattern. However, a clear majority (65.6%  of this group of respondents) remains 
preferring e (+0, +2) over a (+2, +2), therefore violating the strong monotonicity principle. And 
more importantly, 54.1% of this group (50.5% of the overall sample for this question N=327) still 10 
prefer  f (+0,+1.5) over  a (+2+2), that is, they have non-monotonic preferences, and therefore 
Rawlsian preferences are explicitly ruled out for the majority of the sample.  A necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for an individual respondent to hold Rawlsian preferences is to prefer d (+0, 
+2.5) over a (+2, +2), and to prefer a (+2+2) over f (+0,+1.5).  Since there are 68 (21% of 327) 
such respondents, this is the upper limit of Rawlisan individuals in this sample under this question.  
 
4. Titration and random ordering 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 3, comparing the results from the main titration and the main random 
questions, there are no statistically significant differences (p>0.01) between the proportion of 
individuals choosing programme B at corresponding stages of the two versions of the 
questionnaire. So we reject the hypothesis that violation of strong monotonicity is caused by the 
titration sequence of the questionnaire.  
 
Figure 3.Comparison of % individuals choosing programme B: 
titration vs random versions (*) 
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 (*) Number of respondents answering the second variant = 345 
 
 
5. Left-right alignment 
 
Figure 4 presents the distribution of responses on the first page contrasting the original left-right 
alignment and the flipped alignment.  In the original left-right alignment, 13.5% of respondents 
choose (+2,+2) whilst 79.8% choose (+0,+4) and 6.8% are indifferent between both options. With 
the flipped alignment, the proportions are 20.6%, 72.6% and 6.7%, respectively. In order to test 
the response order effect, a test for homogeneity has been undertaken (Rohatgi, 1976). With 95% 
confidence level, we can not reject the hypothesis of equality of proportions in relation with 
options A, B and indifferent (considered jointly). 
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Figure 4.Comparison of distribution of responses between original and flipped alignments(*) 
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(*) Number of respondents answering the second variant = 345 
 
 
6. Alternative monotonicity test 
 
Table 5 presents the results for the alternative monotonicity question: 49.4% of individuals were 
found to choose a (+2,+2) over the closest alternative in the north direction g (+2.5,+2), thereby 
violating monotonicity.  Furthermore, 13.2% had preferences consistent with a Rawlsian HRSWF. 
As programme B moves towards point k those who choose a increases substantially reaching 
62.7%.  
 
Table 5: Alternative question to test for non-monotonicity (*) 
 
Number of respondents (%) (**)    A  B 
Chose A  Chose B  Indiff 
a vs g 78+2, 73+2  78+2.5, 73+2  168 (49.4)  128 (37.5)  45 (13.2) 
a vs h 78+2, 73+2  78+3, 73+2  209 (61.3)  132 (38.7)   
a vs j  78+2, 73+2  78+3.5, 73+2  212 (62.1)  129 (37.9)   
a vs k 78+2, 73+2  78+4, 73+2  213 (62.4)  128 (37.6)   
a vs l  78+2, 73+2  78+4.5, 73+2  214 (62.7)  127 (37.3)   
(*) Number of respondents answering the third variant = 341 
 (**)  percentages sum to 100% along each row  
 
This alternative question adds robustness to the results related to the preferences of majority of 
respondents violating strong monotonicity.  
 
7. Symmetry 
 
Finally, Table 6 summarises the distribution of respondents across the nine possible combinations 
of preferences illustrated in Figure 2 (regarding the new reference point I’). Symmetry requires 
respondents to be in one of the diagonal cells from the left hand side top to the right hand side 
bottom, and a total of 66.5% of those who were given these questions satisfy this.  If we exclude 
those who prefer y (+2,+0) over x (+1,+1) and at the same time z (+0,+2) over x (+1,+1), i.e. 12 
excluding those preferences with welfare contours around x that are concave to the origin, this will 
reduce the proportion of those who are in line with the necessary condition for symmetry to 
54.5%. Of those who support asymmetry, it should be noted that the majority (31.1% of overall) 
are in the expected direction (i.e. in favour of the worse-off) and just 2.4% of the total would be in 
favour of the higher socioeconomic group. 
 
Table 6: Testing for symmetry of preferences (*) 
                        
x f y  x ~ y  y f x  Total 
x f z  172 (50.4) 6 (1.8) 2 (0.6) 180 (52.8)
x ~ z  2 (0.6) 14 (4.1) 0 (0.0) 16 (4.7)
z f x  98 (28.7) 6 (1.8) 41 (12.0) 145 (42.5)
Total  272 (79.8)  26(7.6) 43 (12.6) 341(100.0)
      (*) Number of respondents answering the third variant = 341 
 
 
Similarly, 79.8% of individuals prefer x to y, whilst the proportion of those who prefer x to z are 
just 52.8%. That is, equal distributions are more preferred to unequal ones (by 26 percentage 
points) when the inequality favours the higher socioeconomic group.  
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Monotonicity may be questionable as a welfare principle in the context of HRSWF. This 
conclusion remains when a revised version of the questionnaire reported in A&T is undertaken to 
explore a wider range of preferences and other hypotheses that might have affected the findings in 
A&T regarding preferences that violate strong monotonicity.   
 
The A&T questionnaire was not able to accommodate the preferences of two types of individuals: 
those who are inequality neutral and those whose choice would be affected by the fact that some 
group gets no health gain, which is the case of programme B in the original question. With respect 
to the former, there is the possibility that the proportion of respondents violating strong 
monotonicity had been overestimated because those with inequality neutral preferences had been 
forced to choose programme B instead.  However, this possibility is now ruled out, as only a small 
minority of individuals reported to be inequality neutral when the indifference option was offered 
in the first page of the main questionnaire; in other words, the potential presence of distribution-
neutral health maximisers does not rule out the violation of strong monotonicity of the majority.  It 
should be also acknowledged that it would have been desirable to offer an indifference option in 
subsequent questions of the follow-up page. However, the indifference option was omitted in the 
follow-up questions as we anticipated that for many respondents, this would make the 
questionnaire more complicated and could be an invitation for some respondents to choose the 
indifference option as an “easy” way out of the questionnaire. Indeed, the relatively higher rate of 
non-response or missing in the follow-up page to the inequality neutral question (see Table 1b 
above) may reflect the fact that this page did not include indifference options. The excess 
proportion of those who did not answer this particular follow-up page may be attributable to those 
whose view are distribution neutral along the ∆H1 + ∆H2 = constant line, and therefore did not find 
either option on offer to be appropriate. 
 
With regard to the second issue above, addressed by the everybody gets something question, the 
majority of those who preferred programme A in the very first page remain preferring this 
programme on the follow-up page despite programme B which now gives something to the better 13 
off.  This indicates that the “nobody should get nothing” argument is not a strong concern and, 
therefore, does not affect conclusions regarding violation of strong monotonicity.  
 
One of the central aims of this paper was to check whether preferences that are found to violate the 
strong monotonicity principle are actually non-monotonic or Rawlsian. First of all, the results of 
the very last question of the  main titration version in this study show that the majority of 
Spaniards still prefer health care programme B (+0,+1.5) that reduces health inequalities but gives 
the worse off less health gain than would be achieved through programme A (+2,+2) where health 
inequalities would remain constant. A Rawlsian respondent should, however, choose programme 
A (+2,+2) over programme B (+0,+1.5). Therefore our results confirm that the majority of 
Spaniards have non-monotonic preferences (i.e. violate the weak monotonicity principle as well), 
rather than Rawlsian preferences. In addition, this question suggests that the upper limit of the 
proportion of respondents with Rawlsian preferences is 21%.   
 
Violation of strong  monotonicity is not affected by the titration sequence of the questionnaire 
(main titration). Small incremental reductions in the health gain of the worse-off in programme B 
do not seem to postpone the shift to programme A as compared with the main random version 
where the respondents face bigger decrements. Regarding the left-right effect the results do not 
show evidence of a bias towards (+2,+2) insofar as it is the first option that the respondent can see 
(as it is located on the left hand side); rather, the original and the flipped alignments do not give 
significantly different results.  
 
The  alternative monotonicity  question adds new evidence to the existence of non-monotonic 
preferences. Firstly, on the first page, just about half of individuals (49%) prefer programme A 
(+2,+2) to programme B (+2.5,+2) thus failing to maximise overall health, and having non-
monotonic preferences. The indifference option consistent with Rawlsian preferences, which was 
offered to the respondents in this first question, was chosen by just 13% of individuals (which is 
consistent with the upper limit of 21% identified in the  main titration version). The rest of 
respondents preferred programme B (i.e. have monotonic preferences). At this stage, the result is 
consistent with a Rawlsian preference for the median voter. However, when, in subsequent 
choices, programme B gives the better off more and more health gains (keeping constant the health 
of the worse-off), then an increasing proportion of respondents switches to programme A, 
exceeding the majority by a substantial margin (>60%). This result suggests that it is when health 
inequalities are regarded as being ‘too large’ that concern for equality overrides concern for 
efficiency, resulting in non-monotonic preferences. In other words, there is a point at which 
increasing overall health any further at the expense of health equality would begin to reduce 
overall health related social welfare. An interesting issue to explore would be to estimate where 
that tipping point might be located.    
 
Another issue regarding the interpretation of results is the role of symmetry. The fact that those 
with better health are also those in a higher socio-economic position – with, say, greater ability to 
pay for private care – might have conditioned the responses of some individuals who may have 
used the health outcome to compensate the worse-off group (with lower socioeconomic level), 
thereby violating the symmetry property of SWFs. The results of the test for symmetry show that 
the majority of respondents have symmetric preferences across subgroups of rich and poor 
individuals. This question, however, allows to test for symmetry around point I’ only, and not with 
respect to the current situation (point I), thus being a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
symmetry. In other words, it only gives an upper bound of those who support symmetry, or a 
lower bound for those who support asymmetry. To test whether non-monotonicity of preferences 
would be symmetrically reproduced in the area to the right of the 45º line will face problems of 14 
credibility, as it would require the assumption that the socio-economically better off (worse off) 
have worse (better) health; a situation which does not correspond to the current state of the world
2.  
 
Finally, this study builds on earlier work by the authors, and explores further some of the 
shortcomings concerning the earlier work.  However, if one regards the best evidence of peoples’ 
preferences to be those revealed through personal consumption behaviour, then these studies are 
based on preferences that are fall short of this in two ways: they are stated and not revealed; and 
they are about collective public outcomes and not outcomes to private consumers.  Thus, we would 
like to acknowledge that while we have made good progress on a number of key issues, we have 
not been able to solve all problems.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Standard social welfare functions require the satisfaction of monotonicity because one important 
assumption is invoked: that as a consequence of an increase in someone’s health, ceteris paribus, 
the gain in efficiency should always overcome any loss due to possible increase in inequality. 
However, this assumption, particularly in the health context, is questionable as it has been shown 
in this research. 
 
Alternative ways to elicit public preferences regarding the efficiency-equality trade-off in health 
confirm the evidence that motivated the A&T paper relating to the violation of monotonicity. The 
Spanish median voter has preferences that violate the strong monotonicity principle. This 
conclusion remains once we take into account the presence of inequality neutral preferences and 
other possible sources of bias of the questionnaire used in A&T. In addition, the majority of 
Spaniards have non-monotonic preferences rather than Rawlsian preferences. Finally, symmetry is 
satisfied by the majority of respondents, so there is no evidence that non-monotonicity would have 
an asymmetric pattern for the range tested. Thus, to conclude, more health is not always regarded 
as better for society, as it crucially depends on its distribution and on the extent of social aversion 
to health inequalities. 
 
 
                                                
2 All our examples are rank preserving in that the ranking of the two population groups relative to each other remain 
unaffected after either Programme.  Perhaps a more interesting exercise might be to examine scenarios where health 
gains to the worse-off are big enough to catch up with or even to overtake the better-off. 15 
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APPENDIX 
 
Q.1.1 First page of the main questionnaire (original alignment). 
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Q.2.1 Follow up of those who are indifferent in the first question of the main questionnaire 
(inequality neutral). 
 
 
 
Please tick in the corresponding box whether you prefer programme 
A or B in each of the following options: 
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Q.3.1 Follow-up of those who choose A in the first question of the main questionnaire (everybody 
gets something). 
 
Please tick in the corresponding box whether you prefer programme 
A or B in each of the following options: 
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Q.4.1 Follow-up of those who choose  B in the 1
st question of main questionnaire  (main titration) 
 
Please tick in the corresponding box whether you prefer programme 
A or B in each of the following options: 
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Q.5.1 First page of the main questionnaire (flipped alignment) 
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Q.1.2. Follow-up of those who choose B in the main questionnaire (main random) 
 
Please tick in the corresponding box whether you prefer programme 
A or B in each of the following options: 
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Q.1.3. Alternative question to test for monotonicity (alternative monotonicity) 
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Now, please tick in the corresponding box whether you prefer programme 
A or B in each of the following options: 
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Q.2.3. Question to test for symmetry of preferences (symmetry). 
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